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 to this conference refers to developments in the Court’s case law that impact the 
expectations regarding the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, or: the Court) as the 
“ultimate watchdog over the right to freedom of expression and information for media and 
journalists in Europe”. Over the last decades and particularly the last ten years the Court has 
delivered significant, even remarkable jurisprudence in support of the right to freedom of expression 
and information.
3
 But the Court, including the Grand Chamber, has also delivered some judgments 
that neglect crucial aspects of journalists’ and civil society’s rights to freedom of expression.
4
 
This presentation will focus on all four issues mentioned in the title of this panel. Due to the Court’s 
case law Article 10 ECHR guarantees (1) protection of acts of newsgathering and investigative 
journalism, (2) an enforceable right of access to official documents, (3) far-reaching protection of 
journalistic sources, and (4) protection of whistle-blowers based on the right to freedom of 
expression.
5
 Although the wording of Article 10 ECHR does not contain any reference to any of these 
specific aspects, the ECtHR succeeded in incorporating them in the protection system of the right to 
freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR, only accepting interferences with these 
rights when they meet the strict test of Article 10 § 2 ECHR. This approach by the ECtHR has 
undoubtedly created higher European standards, obliging the member states to increase 
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substantially and effectively the level of protection of the right to freedom of expression and 
information which must be applied and secured in each of these four domains. 
The first part of this presentation will highlight the important contribution and the achievements by 
the ECtHR in guaranteeing, broadening and enforcing the right to freedom of expression and 
information regarding newsgathering and investigative journalism, access to official documents, 
source protection and whistle-blowing. The second part will focus on some shortcomings, loopholes 
or inconsistencies in (recent) judgments and decisions by the ECtHR with regard to these four 
domains. 
Part 1:  
Positive achievements in the ECtHR’s case law in support of Article 10 ECHR 
 
Looking  at the Court’s case law since its first finding of a violation of Article 10 ECHR in the case of 
Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, in 1979, one is confronted with an increasing number of 
judgments in which the ECtHR found violations of the right to freedom of expression.
6
 The Court’s 
jurisprudence shows a dynamic interpretation of the Convention, also and especially in respect of  
applicants’ claims referring to new dimensions of the right to freedom of expression. As a result, 
some aspects of journalistic practices, newsgathering, public debate, access to official documents  
and access to the Internet that were interfered with or lacked protection at national level found 
robust protection in the Strasbourg case law under Article 10 ECHR. The mere fact that the ECtHR in 
hundreds of judgments found violations of the right to freedom of expression shows the added value 
that the ECtHR has created, particularly in upholding high standards of protection for media, 





1.1. Protection of investigative journalism and acts newsgathering 
 
Since Fressoz & Roire v. France the ECtHR has reiterated on several occasions that journalists should 
not be prosecuted or sanctioned because of breach of confidentiality or the use of illegally obtained 
documents, when the disclosure of confidential information is related to journalistic reporting on a 
matter of public interest and the journalist has furthermore acted in accordance with the standards 
of journalistic ethics.
8
 The Court has accepted that the interest in protecting the publication of 
information originating from a source which obtained and retransmitted the information unlawfully 
may in certain circumstances outweigh those of an individual or an entity, private or public, in 
maintaining the confidentiality of the information. In a case where a media company was sanctioned 
for having broadcast information which someone else had obtained illegally, the Court stated that it 
was “not convinced that the mere fact that the recording had been obtained by a third person 
                                                           
6
 Annual Report 2016, European Court of Human Rights, 202-203. See also Dirk Voorhoof, “Freedom of Expression, Media 
and Journalism under the European Human Rights System: Characteristics, Developments, and Challenges”, in Peter Molnàr 
(ed.), Free Speech and Censorship Around the Globe, Budapest - New York, Central European University Press, 2015, 59-104. 
7
 See also Dirk Voorhoof (et al.) and Tarlach McGonagle (Ed. Sup.), Freedom  of  Expression,  the  Media  and  Journalists:  
Case-law  of  the  European  Court  of Human Rights, IRIS Themes, European Audiovisual Observatory, Strasbourg, E-book, 
2016, 451 p. 
8
 ECtHR Grand Chamber 21 January 1999, Fressoz and Roire v. France; ECtHR 25 April 2006, Dammann v. Switzerland; ECtHR 
7 June 2007, Dupuis and Others v. France; ECtHR 19 December 2006, Radio Twist v. Slovakia and ECtHR 28 June 2011, Pinto 
Coelho v. Portugal. 
contrary to law can deprive the applicant company which broadcast it of the protection of Article 10 
of the Convention”.9 A newspaper that published  emails between two public figures that had been 
gathered illegally, directly related to a public discussion on a matter of serious public concern, can be 
shielded by Article 10 ECHR against claims based on the right of privacy as protected under Article 8 
ECHR.10 In a case concerning  the  conviction  of  four  journalists for having illegally recorded and 
broadcast an interview using hidden cameras, the ECtHR found that the Swiss authorities had 
violated the journalists’ rights protected under Article 10  ECHR. The ECtHR emphasised that the use 
of hidden cameras by the journalists was aimed at providing public information on a subject of 
general interest, whereby the person filmed was not targeted in any personal capacity but in a 
professional context. The Court found that the interference with the private life of the person 
concerned had not been serious enough to override the public interest on denouncing malpractice, 
in casu in the field of insurance brokerage.11 
In principle journalists are not above the law, but the interest of the public to be informed on 
matters of public interest can be more important than the enforcement of criminal law. The case law 
of the ECtHR shows that convictions of journalists for breach of professional secrecy (by others) or 
using illegally forwarded documents amounted to violations of the journalists’ right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 ECHR. On several occasions the ECtHR has emphasised that “the 
gathering of information is an essential preparatory step in journalism and is an inherent, protected 
part of press freedom”.12  
The importance of acts of newsgathering being protected under Article 10 ECHR is also reflected in a  
judgment of 9 February 2017, in the case Selmani and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. The case concerns the forcible removal of journalists from the gallery of the national 
parliament where they were reporting on a parliamentary debate in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. In its reasoning the ECtHR referred to the crucial role of the media in providing 
information on the authorities’ handling of public demonstrations and the containment of disorder, 
such as in the present case. It reiterated that the “watchdog” role of the media assumes particular 
importance in such contexts, since their presence is a guarantee that the authorities can be held to 
account for their conduct vis-à-vis the demonstrators and the public at large when it comes to the 
policing of large gatherings, including the methods used to control or disperse protesters or to 
preserve public order. Any attempt to remove journalists from the scene of demonstrations must 
therefore be subject to strict scrutiny, especially “when journalists exercise their right to impart 
information to the public about the behaviour of elected representatives in Parliament and about the 
manner in which authorities handle disorder that occurs during Parliamentary sessions”.13 The ECtHR 
found that the government failed to establish convincingly that the journalists’ removal from the 
gallery was necessary in a democratic society. 
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1.2. Toward a right of access to official documents by journalists, NGOs and other “public 
watchdogs”. 
 
For a long time, the ECtHR saw no reason to apply Article 10 ECHR in cases of denial of access to 
public documents. In the cases Leander v. Sweden, Gaskin v. United Kingdom and Guerra and others 
v. Italy, the Court pointed out “that freedom to receive information (…) basically prohibits a 
government from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing 
to impart to him. That freedom cannot be construed as imposing on a State, in circumstances such as 
those of the present case, positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own 
motion”.14 In Roche v. the United Kingdom in 2005, the Grand Chamber referred to the Leander, 
Gaskin and Guerra judgments and it saw no reason “not to apply this established jurisprudence”.15 
In the spring of 2009 the Court however delivered a judgment in which it recognised, to some extent, 
the right of access to official documents. The ECtHR made clear that when public bodies hold 
information that is needed for public debate, the refusal to provide documents to those who are 
requesting access is a violation of the right to freedom of expression and information as guaranteed 
under Article 10 ECHR. In TASZ v. Hungary the Court’s judgment mentioned the “censorial power of 
an information monopoly” when public bodies refuse to release information needed by the media or 
civil society organisations to perform their “watchdog” function. It also considered that the State had 
an obligation not to impede the flow of information sought by a journalist or NGO. The ECtHR 
recognized civil society’s important contribution to the discussion of public affairs and designated the 
applicant association, which was involved in human rights litigation, as a social “watchdog”. In these 
circumstances the applicant’s activities as an NGO warranted Convention protection similar to that 
afforded to the press. Furthermore, given the applicant’s intention to impart the requested 
information to the public, thereby contributing to the public debate concerning legislation on drug-
related offences, its right to impart information was clearly impaired and the ECtHR found a violation 
of Article 10 ECHR.16  
Also in subsequent cases the ECtHR found violations of Article 10 ECHR because of refusal of access 
to official documents.17 In a judgment of 17 February 2015, in the case of Guseva v. Bulgaria, the 
Court held that “the gathering of information with a view to its subsequent provision to the public can 
be said to fall within the applicant’s freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
Convention”. And: “by not providing the information which the applicant had sought, the mayor 
interfered in the preparatory stage of the process of informing the public by creating an 
administrative obstacle (..) The applicant’s right to impart information was, therefore, impaired”.18 
This right, as has been demonstrated in Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, can also include 
the right to have access to documents belonging to an intelligence agency and its surveillance 
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activities. The ECtHR can even order the authorities of a member state an intelligence agency to 
provide a journalist or NGO with the information requested.
19
 
While some countries and national authorities still tried to deny or even explicitly opposed this new 
development in the Court’s case law since 2009, the Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Magyar 
Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, left no doubt as to the applicability of Article 10 ECHR in cases of 
refusal of access to official documents in the context of an issue of public debate.
20
 By denying access 
to the requested information the Hungarian authorities had impaired the applicant NGO’s exercise of 
its freedom to receive and impart information, in a manner that strikes at the very substance of its 
Article 10 rights. The Court further concentrated on the role of civil society and participatory 
democracy, and emphasised that access to public documents by the press and NGOs can contribute 
to “transparency on the manner of conduct of public affairs and on matters of interest for society as a 
whole and thereby allows participation in public governance”. It considers “that civil society makes an 
important contribution to the discussion of public affairs”, and that “the manner in which public 
watchdogs carry out their activities may have a significant impact on the proper functioning of a 
democratic society. It is in the interest of democratic society to enable the press to exercise its vital 
role of “public watchdog” in imparting information on matters of public concern … just as it is to 
enable NGOs scrutinising the State to do the same thing. Given that accurate information is a tool of 
their trade, it will often be necessary for persons and organisations exercising watchdog functions to 
gain access to information in order to perform their role of reporting on matters of public interest. 
Obstacles created in order to hinder access to information may result in those working in the media or 
related fields no longer being able to assume their “watchdog” role effectively, and their ability to 
provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected”. Before Article 10 ECHR can 
come into play, however, the information requested should not only be instrumental for the exercise 
of the right to freedom of expression: the information to which access is sought must also meet a 
“public-interest test” for the disclosure to be considered necessary under Article 10 ECHR. In 
addition, whether the person seeking access to the information in question does so with a view to 
informing the public in the capacity of a public “watchdog” and whether the information requested is 
“ready and available” are also important considerations for the Court. The Court does not restrict the 
notion of public watchdog “exclusively to NGOs and the press”, as it reiterates “that a high level of 
protection also extends to academic researchers (..) and authors of literature on matters of public 
concern (..)”. The Grand Chamber also emphasises “that given the important role played by the 
Internet in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information (..), 
the function of bloggers and popular users of the social media may be also assimilated to that of 
“public watchdogs” in so far as the protection afforded by Article 10 is concerned”.21 After finding 
that the denial to give the applicant NGO access to the requested information was an interference 
with the NGO’s rights under Article 10, the ECtHR explained why this amounted to a violation of 
Article 10 ECHR. The Grand Chamber considered that the information requested by the NGO was 
“necessary” for it to exercise its right to freedom of expression and it found that no privacy rights 
would have been negatively affected had the NGO’s request for information been granted. 
The Grand Chamber’s judgment in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is considered as an 
important victory for journalists, bloggers, academics, and NGOs, who rely on access to public 
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documents in order to conduct investigations as part of their role as “public watchdogs”. A 
consequence of the judgment in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is that limitations or 
restrictions regarding access to official documents at national level cannot have an absolute 
character any more: the interests that eventually justify these limitations or restrictions, such as 
privacy or protection of personal data, or national security, must be balanced with the right of 
access to information and its contribution to the right of the public to be informed on matters of 
public interest. Most fundamentally, refusals at national level of requests of access to public 
documents that meet the criteria put forward in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, can now be 
scrutinized by the ECtHR. This means that the Strasbourg Court looks over the shoulder of the 
national authorities at the way they implement and effectively secure the right of access to public 
documents on request by journalists, bloggers, academics, NGOs and other “public watchdogs”.  
The Grand Chamber’s approach in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary also reflects an evolutive 
interpretation of Article 10 ECHR, with references to the developments in its own case law since 
2005 and to national and international sources of law recognising a right of access to public 
documents. The Grand Chamber notes that “there exists a broad consensus, in Europe (and beyond) 
on the need to recognise an individual right of access to State-held information in order to assist the 
public in forming an opinion on matters of general interest”, and that therefore the ECtHR is not 
“prevented from interpreting Article 10 § 1 of the Convention as including a right of access to 
information”. Continuing its dynamic approach, the ECtHR argued that “to hold that the right of 
access to information may under no circumstances fall within the ambit of Article 10 of the 
Convention would lead to situations where the freedom to “receive and impart” information is 
impaired in such a manner and to such a degree that it would strike at the very substance of freedom 
of expression. For the Court, in circumstances where access to information is instrumental for the 
exercise of the applicant’s right to receive and impart information, its denial may constitute an 
interference with that right. The principle of securing Convention rights in a practical and effective 
manner requires an applicant in such a situation to be able to rely on the protection of Article 10 of 
the Convention”.22 
1.3. A robust protection of journalistic sources, including important procedural safeguards 
Another important characteristic of the protection of the rights of media and journalists is reflected 
in the Court’s case law on protection of journalistic sources. According to the Court “protection of 
journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom, as recognised and reflected in 
various international instruments including the Committee of Ministers Recommendation (..). Without 
such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters 
of public interest. As a result the vital public watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the 
ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected. Having 
regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic 
society and the potentially chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that 
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freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified 
by an overriding requirement in the public interest”.23 
Only with respect of strict substantial and procedural guarantees interferences with the right to 
protection of journalists’ sources can be justified. The ECtHR can only accept a disclosure order or 
any other interference with a journalist’s source in order to meet an “overriding requirement in the 
public interest”, such as for instance preventing or investigating major crime or acts of (racist) 
violence, protecting the right to life or preventing that minors would be sexually abused and hence 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.
24
  
In its 2010 Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers v. the Netherlands25, the ECtHR 
referred to “the vital importance to press freedom of the protection of journalistic sources and of 
information that could lead to their identification” and it emphasised that “any interference with the 
right to protection of such sources must be attended with legal procedural safeguards commensurate 
with the importance of the principle at stake”. It also noted that “orders to disclose sources 
potentially have a detrimental impact, not only on the source, whose identity may be revealed, but 
also on the newspaper or other publication against which the order is directed, whose reputation may 
be negatively affected in the eyes of future potential sources by the disclosure, and on members of 
the public, who have an interest in receiving information imparted through anonymous sources”. First 
and foremost among the procedural safeguards is “the guarantee of review by a judge or other 
independent and impartial decision-making body”. The ECtHR went on clarifying that “(t)he requisite 
review should be carried out by a body separate from the executive and other interested parties, 
invested with the power to determine whether a requirement in the public interest overriding the 
principle of protection of journalistic sources exists prior to the handing over of such material and to 
prevent unnecessary access to information capable of disclosing the sources' identity if it does not”. 
The ECtHR concluded in Sanamo Uitgevers v. the Netherlands that the quality of the law in the 
Netherlands was deficient, in that there was no procedure attended by adequate legal safeguards for 
the applicant company in order to enable an independent assessment as to whether the interest of 
the criminal investigation overrode the public interest in the protection of journalistic sources. There 
had accordingly been a violation of Article 10 ECHR in that the interference complained of was not 
“prescribed by law”. Incorporating the guarantee of an ex ante review by a judge or other 
independent and impartial decision-making body obviously has an enormous impact, as any 
interference with or access to journalists’ sources by public prosecutors or police, without prior 
authorisation by a judge or independent and impartial decision-making body amounts as such to a 
breach of Article 10 ECHR. In situations of urgency, a procedure should exist to identify and isolate, 
prior to the exploitation of the material by the authorities, information that could lead to the 
identification of sources from information that carries no such risk. In such urgent situations the 
ECtHR clarified that “an independent review carried out at the very least prior to the access and use 
of obtained materials should be sufficient to determine whether any issue of confidentiality arises, 
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and if so, whether in the particular circumstances of the case the public interest invoked by the 
investigating or prosecuting authorities outweighs the general public interest of source protection”.26 
On several occasions, the European Court was of the opinion that searches of media offices, or in the 
home and place of work of journalists amounted to a violation of Article 10 ECHR, disrespecting the 
subsidiarity principle or the proportionality principle in cases of protection of journalistic sources.
27
 
Searches and confiscations in the newsroom or in the journalist’s private house, with the aim of 
identifying an alleged “leaking” civil servant or employee, such as in Roemen and Schmit v. 
Luxembourg, Tillack v. Belgium and Nagla v. Latvia, were considered as violations of Article 10 ECHR. 
In the case of Tillack v. Belgium the ECtHR clarified that a “journalist’s right not to reveal her or his 
sources could not be considered a mere privilege to be granted or taken away depending on the 
lawfulness or unlawfulness of their sources, but is part and parcel of the right to information, to be 
treated with the utmost caution”.28 
The right of journalists to shield their sources shows in many cases the need to protect the leaking of 
information by whistle-blowers, as illustrated in the Court’s case law in Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, Voskuil v. the Netherlands, Tillack v. Belgium, Financial 
Times Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, Nagla v. Latvia and most recently in Görmüş and others v. Turkey.29 
In the latter case the ECtHR held that a contested article published in a Turkish magazine, on the 
basis of confidential military documents, was capable of contributing to public debate, as it had been 
highly pertinent in relation to discussions on discrimination against the media by State bodies in 
Turkey. The ECtHR considered the seizure, retrieval and storage by the Turkish authorities of all of 
the magazine’s computer data, with a view to identifying the public-sector whistle-blowers who 
leaked the document, as a disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of expression and 
information. The Court also held that the impugned interference by the Turkish authorities could risk 
deterring potential sources from assisting the press in informing the public of matters involving the 
armed forces, including when they concerned a public interest. In the Court’s view, this intervention 
was likely not only to have very negative repercussions on the relationships of the journalists in 
question with their sources, but could also have a serious and chilling effect on other journalists or 
other whistle-blowers who were State officials, and could discourage them from reporting any 
misconduct or controversial acts by public authorities. Furthermore, the ECtHR noted that the 
reasons for which the contested documents had been classified as confidential were not justified, as 
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the government had not shown that there had been a detrimental impact as a result of their 
disclosure. 
1.4. Protection of whistle-blowers 
Over and above the indirect protection of whistle-blowers through the recognition and application of 
the journalist’s right to source protection, the ECtHR in its recent case law has added substantial 
protection to whistle-blowers in a direct way. Indeed while in most European countries there is no 
solid or effective protection of whistle-blowers for disclosing information of public interest, the 
ECtHR has tried to remedy this situation by securing whistle-blowers protection under Article 10 
ECHR. In its judgment in Guja v. Moldova the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR considered the dismissal 
of a civil servant who had leaked information to the press revealing corrupt practices within politics 
and the administration of justice, to be an unjustified and disproportionate interference with his 
right to freedom of expression.30 Most importantly, the Court noted that “a civil servant, in the 
course of his work, may become aware of in-house information, including secret information, whose 
divulgation or publication corresponds to a strong public interest”. The protection guaranteed by 
Article 10 ECHR is conditional, but also substantial. First of all, the ECtHR considered it necessary to 
examine whether or not the information could have been communicated in another, internal, way in 
order to reveal and remedy the wrongdoing at issue. However, the Court imposed the condition that 
an internal duty to report also has to be an effective mechanism to remedy the wrongdoing that one 
wants to uncover: “In assessing whether the restriction on freedom of expression was proportionate, 
therefore, the Court must take into account whether there was available to the applicant any other 
effective means of remedying the wrongdoing which he intended to uncover”. Apart from the 
expectation that a whistle-blower has in principle a duty to report wrongdoing internally before any 
public disclosure to media or journalists, there are also some more factors to be taken into account. 
Indeed, a public interest must be at issue; the information that has been leaked must be authentic 
and accurate; the damage the information can produce and the public interest will have to be 
weighed up; good faith must be the basis of the motives for uncovering the information; and the 
sanction imposed must be proportionate. Having regard to each of these criteria and factors the 
ECtHR concluded that Guja’s dismissal amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of expression 
and especially his right to impart information, as guaranteed under Article ECHR. 
Also in more recent cases the Court has found violations of Article 10 ECHR where whistle-blowers, 
both in the public and the private sector, had experienced interference with their right to freedom of 
expression, including the disclosure of confidential information to the media. The Court’s case law, 
applying the six criteria in Guja v. Moldova, gave crucial protection to whistle-blowing by civil 
servants and government officials. Even whistle-blowing by magistrates and employees of military 
intelligence agencies is effectively protected pursuant to Article 10 ECHR.
31 In Bucur and Toma v. 
Romania the ECtHR considered that the general interest in the disclosure of information to the 
media revealing illegal activities within the Romanian Intelligence Services (RIS) was so important in a 
democratic society that it prevailed over the interest in maintaining public confidence in that 
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institution. While the Court was not convinced that a formal complaint to a Parliamentary 
Commission would have been an effective means of tackling the irregularities within RIS, it also 
observed that the information about the illegal telecommunication surveillance of journalists, 
politicians and businesses that had been disclosed to the press affected the democratic foundations 
of the state. The fact that the data and information at issue were classified as “ultra-secret” was not 
a sufficient reason to interfere with the whistle-blower’s right in this case and the measures taken 
also risked creating a chilling effect. The conviction for the disclosure of information to the media 





Critical comments: shortcomings, loopholes and inconsistencies  
The brief overview of developments in the Court’s case law leaves no doubt about the enormous 
support the Court’s jurisprudence has created in the last decade to the right to freedom of 
expression and information. But, as already mentioned in the introduction, the ECtHR has also 
delivered some decisions and judgments neglecting crucial aspects of journalists’ and civil society’s 
rights to freedom of expression. Some of the judgments in which the Court found no violation of 
Article 10 ECHR have been sharply criticised within the Court itself, showing a fierce disagreement 
expressed in dissenting opinions.33 Paraphrasing the Grand Chamber in Morice v. France, the 
following critical comments are also meant as “constructive criticism”34, in order to draw attention to 
what can be qualified as (potential) shortcomings in the Court’s reasoning in applying Article 10 
ECHR.  They are also formulated in the spirit that was evoked by the former president of the ECtHR, 
Luzius Wildhaber: “(i)nstitutions (..) will perish, if those who love them do not criticise them, and if 
those who criticise them do not love them”.35 By highlighting some of the problematic findings by the 
ECtHR the dialogue can indeed be nourished between the judges and lawyers of the ECtHR and the 
community of freedom of expression gathered at this conference under the title “Promoting dialogue 
between the European Court of Human Rights and the media freedom community”. 
2.1. Challenges to protection of investigative journalism and acts of newsgathering 
 
Two recent Grand Chamber judgments are especially worrying. The finding of no violation of Article 
10 ECHR in the case of Pentikäinen v. Finland36 (arrest, detention and prosecution of a journalist for 
disobeying a police order to leave a demonstration) is discussed in the third panel of this conference, 
and therefore we refer to the excellent analysis by Daniel Simons and the reflections on this case by 
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the other panelists.
37
 The crucial question remains: how could Pentikäinen’s detention, prosecution 
in a criminal court and final conviction be held necessary in order to protect public safety and 
prevent disorder and crime, bearing in mind that no allegation was made that he posed a threat to 
public order on account of violent behaviour nor was he taking any active part in the demonstration? 
It is also remarkable that the majority of the Court casts doubts whether Pentikäinen has acted in 
accordance with “responsible journalism”, simply for disobeying a police order to leave the scene of a 
demonstration that he was covering as a journalist and was subsequently supposed to report on. The 
approach by the Grand Chamber that a journalist is not entitled to obtain “a preferential or different 
treatment in comparison to the people left at the scene” 38 obviously neglects the difference between 
the journalist executing his task as member of the press playing its public watch-dog role and the 
demonstrators who were responsible for the event turning into a riot. The judgment in the case of 
Pentikäinen v. Finland has provoked the reaction that this is “a missed opportunity for the Court to 
reinforce, in line with its consistent case-law, the special nature and importance of the press in 
providing transparency and accountability for the exercise of governmental power by upholding the 
rights of journalists to observe public demonstrations or other Article 11 activities effectively and 
unimpeded, so long as they do not take a direct and active part in hostilities. Recent events in many 
European countries demonstrate, more than ever, the necessity of safeguarding the fundamental role 
of the press in obtaining and disseminating to the public information on all aspects of governmental 
activity. That is, after all, one of the crucial elements of the democratic ideal protected by the 
European Convention on Human Rights”. This is not a quote from an NGO advocating for freedom of 
expression, nor a statement from a press release by the European Centre for Press and Media 
Freedom or the European Federation of Journalists. It is the final conclusion by four dissenting judges 
of the Grand Chamber itself, firmly protesting against the approach and findings by the Grand 
Chamber’s majority in Pentikäinen v. Finland. 
Another highly controversial judgment was delivered by the Grand Chamber on 29 March 2016 in the 
case of Bédat v. Switzerland.
39 In its earlier decision the Chamber of the Court had found a violation 
of Article 10 ECHR in this case.40 The Chamber considered the criminal sanction of Bédat, who had 
published confidential information about a criminal case, to be not necessary in a democratic society. 
The Grand Chamber overruled this finding by fifteen votes to two. The Grand Chamber is of the 
opinion that the Swiss authorities stayed within their margin of appreciation and that recourse to 
criminal proceedings and the penalty imposed on the journalist did not amount to a disproportionate 
interference in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. The Grand Chamber emphasised 
that as a professional journalist Bédat must have been aware of the confidential nature of the 
information which he was planning to publish and that the publication of extracts from secret 
criminal files amounted to a criminal offence under Swiss law. The ECtHR also refers to the 
“sensationalist tone” of the impugned article and it considers that the journalist had failed to 
demonstrate that his article could have contributed to any public debate on the ongoing 
investigation. It agrees with the findings by the Swiss Courts that the records of interviews and the 
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accused’s correspondence had been “discussed in the public sphere, before the conclusion of the 
investigation, before the trial and out of context, in a manner liable to influence the decisions taken 
by the investigating judge and the trial court”. According to the Grand Chamber, “(t)he risk of 
influencing proceedings justifies per se the adoption by the domestic authorities of deterrent 
measures such as prohibition of the disclosure of secret information”.41  It found in the present case 
that the recourse to criminal proceedings and the penalty imposed on Bédat did not amount to a 
disproportionate interference in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression.  
Two judges strongly dissented (López Guerra and Yudkivska). Yudkivska formulated a robust message 
at the end of her dissenting opinion, by pointing out that “(t)his Court had always regarded the press 
as the servant of an effective judicial system, granting little scope for restrictions on freedom of 
expression in such matters as the public interest in the proper administration of justice. In my view, 
the present judgment constitutes a regrettable departure from this long-established position”.  
 
The Grand Chamber’s judgment in Bédat v. Switzerland is indeed highly controversial for several 
reasons. First, the Court refers to the concept of “responsible journalism”, including the expectation 
that a journalist in his or her actions of newsgathering shall not breach the law, even in cases where a 
journalist has acted in order to inform the public on important matters in society.42 In fact the Grand 
Chamber opts for a kind of circular reasoning. Indeed the starting point is that the journalist is 
prosecuted for committing a criminal offence, while the journalist’s defence is that this criminal 
offence is justifiable in order to pursue his task as public-watchdog in society. Adding the condition 
that a journalist must act “responsibly” and by requiring that he shall not breach the law, the scope 
of the public interest defence of journalists is at risk of being substantially narrowed down, if not 
annihilated. Secondly, it is remarkable that the Court is not so much considering the pressing social 
need of the interference at issue, but is rather requesting from the journalist to give evidence that 
the content of the article has effectively contributed to a public debate. While emphasising that the 
journalist in this case “failed to demonstrate” that the article contributed to a debate on a matter of 
public interest, the Grand Chamber is of the opinion that the authorities do not need to demonstrate 
that the interference in the journalist’s freedom of expression was effectively necessary. For the 
Grand Chamber it is enough that the article might “in one or another way” influence the 
investigation, the position of the victims or the objectivity of the trial court, without further 
specifying where precisely the impact or prejudice is or was to be situated. For the Grand Chamber 
such influences are an “inherent risk” of making information public that is part of the secret criminal 
investigation. And while in other judgments the Court took into consideration whether or not the 
criminal court was composed of professional judges, in order to evaluate the impact of media 
coverage on the fair trial principle and presumption of innocence, now the Grand Chamber 
emphasises the risk of influencing the trial court “irrespective of its composition”.   
Finally, it is remarkable that the Grand Chamber expands its approach of balancing the competing 
interests of privacy protection (Article 8) and freedom of expression (Article 10) to the situation of 
conflicting interests between fair trial (Article 6) and freedom of expression. The ECtHR indeed 
considers that analogous reasoning must apply in weighing up the rights secured under Article 10 
and Article 6 § 1 respectively. Meanwhile there is no doubt that Article 8 has a horizontal effect and 
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that the state has a positive obligation in order to ensure that other private persons do not interfere 
with the privacy of fellow citizens or data subjects, Article 6 § 1 and the fair trial principle is of 
another nature. Article 6 § 1 ECHR does indeed impose a direct obligation for the state authorities 
themselves to secure fair trial principles, including the presumption of innocence before independent 
and impartial judges and courts. Broadening the scope and enforcement of the presumption of 
innocence to be respected by private actors in society is a problematic extension of Article 6 § 1 
ECHR, and it further weakens the right of freedom of expression being situated in the frame of 
conflicting rights, with consequently a wider margin of appreciation for the State authorities to 
interfere, even by way of criminal prosecution and conviction of journalists. Requiring media 
reporting about crime and court cases, including major crime and even acts of terrorism, to uphold 
the presumption of innocence as it is required from the judiciary, is a big step to take. Actually it is 
too big a step and it contrasts with the Court’s viewpoint that “it is inconceivable that there should be 
no prior or contemporaneous discussion of the subject matter of trials, be it in specialised journals, in 
the general press or amongst the public at large. Not only do the media have the task of imparting 
such information and ideas; the public also has a right to receive them”. Furthermore, imposing on 
media and journalism the same or a similar obligation in upholding the presumption of innocence as 
it applies to the judiciary is not only a ‘mission impossible’, it also confuses the different roles and 
functions of the media and the judiciary. It is up to the authorities to guarantee within the 
administration of justice the highest possible level of ensuring the impartiality and independence of 
judges and to have the presumption of innocence respected by them. The duties and responsibilities 
of media and journalists should not be derived from Article 6 § 1 ECHR, but should be evaluated from 
the scope of Article 10 § 2 ECHR. There is no doubt that journalists and media are to bear in mind the 
presumption of innocence when reporting and commenting on pending criminal proceedings. It is 
certainly one of the basic principles of journalistic ethics and may induce their civil liability. 
Criminalising journalists and media because of the publication of (leaked) information from criminal 
investigations, because this kind of information as such, in abstracto and inherently risks affecting 
the rights guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 ECHR, creates a new legal standard that limits substantially the 
actual practices of court and crime reporting in Europe. The new standard the Grand Chamber has 
introduced makes it possible that state authorities will develop a stricter policy and will prosecute, as 
part of their (alleged) positive obligations under Article 6 § 1 ECHR, media and journalists because of 
publishing leaked information from criminal files, even in cases of media reporting about major 
crime. 
Although extremely controversial, this approach by the Grand Chamber has been confirmed and 
even been reinforced in the case of Giesbert and others v. France.
43
 In a unanimous decision this 
time the ECtHR held that the French judicial authorities’ orders sanctioning the editor-in-chief and a 
journalist of the magazine Le Point for publishing documents from a set of criminal proceedings 
before it was to be read out at a public hearing, in the high profile “Bettancourt” case, did not violate 
Article 10 ECHR. Given the public interest in the case, which was neglected or at least 
underestimated in the domestic proceedings, and the absence of reliance on privacy rights, the 
balance in this case could have been expected to have been struck in a different way. The Court 
noted that the applicant journalists could not have been unaware of the origin of the documents 
reproduced in their articles nor of the confidentiality of the information published, while the French 
law clearly punishes the mere fact that such documents have been published: “Cela étant, les 
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requérants devaient savoir que la publication littérale d’une partie des actes litigieux se heurtait à la 
prohibition de cette disposition”.44 The ECtHR reiterates also that “un simple risque d’influence sur les 
suites d’une procédure peut suffire” to justify an interference or sanction caused by publishing 
documents relating to the secrets of criminal investigation. This refers to the consideration in Bédat 
v. Switzerland that “an inherent risk of influencing the course of proceedings in one way or another” 
can indeed be a sufficient reason for an interference with the journalist’s right to freedom of 
expression: “(t)he risk of influencing proceedings justifies per se the adoption by the domestic 
authorities of deterrent measures such as prohibition of the disclosure of secret information”.45  
It is most surprising that the ECtHR concludes that the domestic findings had met “a sufficiently 
compelling social need” to take precedence over the public interest in the freedom of the press. This 
formulation is indeed surprising, as until now the threshold to justify interference in the right to 
freedom of expression has been the presence of “a pressing social need”. In the original French 
version of the judgment, it is formulated slightly differently, the Court finding that “les 
condamnations répondaient à un besoin social assez impérieux pour primer l’intérêt public 
s’attachant à la liberté de la presse (..)”.46 The judgment in Giesbert and others v. France therefore 
constitutes another regrettable departure from the Court’s long-established position.  
While instances of  interference with court and crime reporting should be carefully scrutinised by the 
ECtHR along the lines of the criteria developed in the Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Axel 
Springer AG v. Germany of 7 February 201247, this approach is at least not obvious in a few recent 
decisions and judgments of the ECtHR. In Salumäki v. Finland the central issue was whether the title 
of a newspaper article that could be interpreted as damaging the reputation of a public person could 
justify the criminal conviction of the journalist who wrote the article, while the article itself was 
written in good faith and did not contain any factual errors or defamatory allegations.
48
 The front 
page of the newspaper carried a headline asking whether the victim of a homicide had connections 
with K.U., a well-known Finnish businessman. A photograph of K.U. appeared on the same page and 
next to the article was a separate column mentioning K.U.’s previous conviction for economic crimes. 
Salumäki complained that her conviction amounted to a violation of Article 10 ECHR, arguing that the 
information presented in the article was correct and that the title of the article only connected K.U. 
to the victim and did not insinuate that K.U. had connections with the perpetrator, nor that he was 
involved in the homicide. First the ECtHR emphasised that the criminal investigation into a homicide 
was clearly a matter of legitimate public interest, having regard in particular to the serious nature of 
the crime : “From the point of view of the general public’s right to receive information about matters 
of public interest, and thus from the standpoint of the press, there were justified grounds for 
reporting the matter to the public”.  The ECtHR also recognised that “the article was based on 
information given by the authorities and K.U.’s photograph had been taken at a public event”, while 
“the facts set out in the article at issue were not in dispute even before the domestic courts. There is 
no evidence, or indeed any allegation, of factual errors, misrepresentation or bad faith on the part of 
the applicant”. Nevertheless the decisive factor in this case was that according to the domestic 
courts, the title created a connection between K.U. and the homicide, implying that he was involved 
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in it. Even though it was specifically stated in the text of the article that the homicide suspect had no 
connections with K.U., this information only appeared towards the end of the article. The ECtHR is of 
the opinion that Salumäki must have considered it probable that her article contained a false 
insinuation and that this false insinuation was capable of causing suffering to K.U. The Court refers to 
the principle of presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 ECHR and emphasises that this 
principle may be relevant also in Article 10 contexts in situations in which nothing is clearly stated 
but only insinuated. The Court therefore comes to the conclusion that what the journalist had 
written was defamatory, implying that K.U. was somehow responsible for P.O.’s murder. Having 
regard to all the foregoing factors, and leaving a (very) wide margin of appreciation to the domestic 
authorities, the ECtHR considers that a fair balance had been struck between the competing interests 
at stake. There has therefore been no violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
Also a recent decision by the ECtHR in which the rights of Article 8 and 10 were conflicting, illustrates 
that in certain cases of crime and court reporting the ECtHR left a very broad margin of appreciation 
to the judicial authorities of the defending state and discarded its own findings based on some of the 
crucial criteria of the Axel Springer-judgment. In Barbara Van Beukering and Het Parool B.V. v. the 
Netherlands49 the ECtHR first makes clear that it sees no reason to doubt “that the newspaper article 
– which announced the trial of R.P. for having stabbed three members of the staff of a shelter for the 
homeless in Amsterdam with a knife, killing one and seriously injuring the two others – was a matter 
of serious public concern. The same may be said about the violent subculture to which R.P. belonged 
and R.P.’s personal circumstances in so far as they were typical of members of that social group. Nor 
is there any reason to doubt that R.P. enjoyed a certain notoriety, which he had actively encouraged 
by giving his co-operation to the 2007 television documentary and a rap clip made available on 
YouTube; that the article published by the applicants in the newspaper Het Parool and on their web 
site was true and correct; and that adding the portrait image enhanced the article’s expressive 
power”. After this findings and evaluation of the facts of the case, the ECtHR refers to the view of the 
domestic authorities’ that “these features of the case did not outweigh R.P.’s right to respect for his 
private life”, as “in publishing portraits of persons suspected of criminal acts reticence [was], in 
principle, appropriate”. On this basis, without any more reference to its own findings regarding the 
other relevant characteristics of the case, the ECtHR considers that the domestic judicial authorities 
did not act “unreasonably in deciding thus”. On this slim basis and taking an overly deferential 
position, the ECtHR finds the application ill-founded and declares it inadmissible, rejecting the claim 
of a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
A worrying trend for investigative journalism is also reflected in two recent decisions by the ECtHR 
dealing with “check it out”-journalism50, namely in the cases Diamant Salihu and others v. Sweden51 
and Boris Erdtmann v. Germany.52 Investigative journalism sometimes operates at the limits of the 
law and this is especially true for “check it out”-journalism: reporting in which a journalist tests how 
effective a law or procedure is by attempting to circumvent it. The decisions in Diamant Salihu and 
others v. Sweden and Boris Erdtmann v. Germany show that journalists who commit (minor) offences 
during this type of newsgathering activity cannot count on (major) support from the ECtHR.  
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In the Swedish case, journalists of the newspaper Expressen had undertaken to demonstrate the easy 
availability of illegal firearms by purchasing one. The Swedish courts were of the opinion that the 
editor and the journalists could not be exempted from criminal liability as they had wilfully breached 
the Swedish Weapons Act. In a unanimous decision, the ECtHR confirmed the necessity of the 
journalists’ criminal conviction. It declared the application for alleged breach of the right of 
journalistic newsgathering under Article 10 ECHR manifestly ill-founded. Coming after the Grand 
Chamber’s judgment in Pentikäinen v. Finland and Bédat v. Switzerland, the decision in Diamant 
Salihu and others v. Sweden can be perceived as a new step in downgrading the rights of journalists 
with regard to their newsgathering activities. The Court’s ruling may also have a chilling effect on 
undercover investigative reporting. Referring to the Grand Chamber judgment in Pentikäinen v. 
Finland, the Court in Diamant Salihu and others v. Sweden reiterates that “notwithstanding the vital 
role played by the media in a democratic society, journalists cannot, in principle, be released from 
their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law on the basis that, as journalists, Article 10 affords them a 
cast-iron defence. In other words, a journalist cannot claim an exclusive immunity from criminal 
liability for the sole reason that, unlike other individuals exercising the right to freedom of expression, 
the offence in question was committed during the performance of his or her journalistic functions”. In 
contrast with the facts in Mikkelsen and Christensen v. Denmark on the purchasing and transport of 
illegal and dangerously explosive fireworks53, the applicants in Diamant Salihu and others v. Sweden 
took a series of relevant safety precautions, and there is no suggestion any risk was created. The 
Swedish Supreme Court indeed explicitly recognised that there had been “no risk that the firearm 
would be used and that it was for a journalistic purpose”. The decisive argument, echoed by the 
ECtHR, was that the breach of law was not necessary for the story: “the question if it was easy to 
purchase a firearm could have been illustrated in other ways”. In the past, the ECtHR has stressed 
that judges should be careful not to “substitute their own views for those of the press as to what 
technique of reporting should be adopted by journalists”54. Against this background, the Court’s 
failure to explain its assertion that the journalists could have made their point in another way is at 
least deplorable, as it is not readily obvious that they could. The Swedish Supreme Court argued that 
the journalists’ purpose had already been achieved when they received the offer to purchase the 
firearm. But this is not entirely convincing: at that point, there was still a possible doubt about the 
seriousness of the offer. Purchasing the firearm also allowed the journalists to take pictures proving 
and documenting their story. As the ECtHR has stated at earlier occasions: “if the national courts 
apply an overly rigorous approach to the assessment of journalists’ professional conduct, the latter 
could be unduly deterred from discharging their function of keeping the public informed”55. In this 
instance, the journalists were reporting on a matter of substantial public interest and appear to have 
acted in good faith, without causing the type of risk the Swedish Weapons Act aims to prevent. The 
journalists’ criminal conviction and the fines imposed on them, while below the normal statutory 
level, may have a potential chilling effect on investigative journalism on issues of societal interest. 
 
The case of Boris Erdtmann v. Germany concerned the conviction of a journalist for carrying a 
weapon on board an aeroplane. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York,  
Erdtmann researched the effectiveness of security checks at German airports and he made a short 
television documentary about his investigation and findings, filmed with a hidden camera. The ECtHR 
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found that the criminal conviction of the journalist was pertinent and necessary in a democratic 
society and that there was no appearance of a violation of the journalist’s rights under Article 10 
ECtHR. Again the ECtHR emphasises that the journalist “must, or could, have known that his actions 
infringed ordinary criminal law” and it accepts the reasoning by the domestic courts that Erdtmann 
could have revealed the security flaws at the airport without committing a criminal offence, for 
example by abandoning the attempted offence by disposing of the knife after the security check-
points.  Although it is recognised that Erdtmann’s report “had in fact increased airport security, that 
he was a television journalist reporting on an issue of general public interest, and that the knife had 
been securely stowed away and did not lead to any concrete threat for the other passengers”, still the 
criminal conviction of the journalist in the form of a warning and deferred fine, being the most 
lenient sentence possible to domestic law, was considered necessary in a democratic society. The 
ECtHR was of the opinion that the conviction of Erdtmann had no chilling effect discouraging the 
press from investigating a certain topic or expressing an opinion on topics of public debate. 
To what extent “check it out”-journalism should enjoy the protection of Article 10 ECHR remains a 
thorny but important issue. By leaving a (very) wide margin of appreciation to the national 
authorities and especially by relying on the non-substantiated argument that other ways of 
journalistic reporting could also have demonstrated the easy availability of firearms or the lack of 
security in airports, the ECtHR has missed an opportunity in both decisions for a more in-depth 
examination about this form of investigative journalism, especially as in both cases the journalists did 
not create any security risk. 
A third dimension with regard the protection of investigative journalism is related to safety aspects 
for the journalists themselves. At several occasions the ECtHR has emphasised the positive 
obligations doctrine such as in cases of violence against or assassinations of journalists. Physical 
violence against journalists can amount not only to a violation of Article 10, but also to a violation of 
the right to life (Article 2) or of the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 
3), in combination sometimes with the right to an effective remedy (Article 13)
56
. In recent cases 
relating to killings of or violent attacks on journalists, the ECtHR reiterated that States, under their 
positive obligations of the Convention, are required to create a favourable environment for 
participation in public debate by all the persons concerned, enabling them to express their opinions 
and ideas without fear
57
. However, in some cases the Court only finds a violation of Article 2 or 3 
ECHR under the procedural limb, because of lack of investigation of the violent attacks. After finding 
a violation of Article 2 or 3 ECHR, the Court considered that there was no need to examine the 
complaint under Article 10 ECHR
58
. As the two dissenting judges in the case of Huseynova v. 
Azerbaijan pointed out “(t)he consequence of the approach the Court has adopted so far is that the 
motives behind the killing of a journalist are not given any prominence”. Therefore it is preferable to 
interpret the lack of an investigation into the killing of a journalist also in the context of Article 10 
ECHR, as this could reveal the specific features of this fundamental human-rights violation, namely 
the potential motive behind the killing of a journalist, is aim of silencing a critical voice in a country. 
Such an approach would be able to take into consideration the destructive effect of violent acts 
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against journalists and it would guarantee that the ECtHR is not turning a blind eye to the fact that 
murders of journalists are to be understood as “the most extreme form of censorship”.59 By not 
examining these kinds of complaints under Article 10 ECHR the ECtHR risks neglecting a crucial 
dimension and the particular political context in which journalists and media workers are the victims 
of violence. As it is stated in the partly dissenting opinion in Huseynova v. Azerbaijan, if this “is 
omitted, the central question of the case, which is of utmost importance for democracy, political 
pluralism and human rights in general, has not been addressed adequately”. 
2.2. The right of access to official documents: only instrumental, conditional and limited 
The importance and impact of the support by the Court’s case law in guaranteeing a right of access 
to official documents has been extensively explained in the first part of this analysis. The recent 
judgment in the case of Bubon v. Russia
60
 raises concerns, however, on how to apply the conditions 
and criteria developed in the Grand Chamber judgment in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary (cf. 
supra part 1), especially with regard to the condition that the requested information must be “ready 
and available”. In its judgment of 7 February 2017 the ECtHR accepts the Russian Government’s 
arguments that the authorities did not have information or documents that were specifically sought 
by the applicant. The information the applicant was seeking “was therefore not only not “ready and 
available”, but did not exist in the form the applicant was looking for”. In this case the applicant is a 
lawyer who also writes articles for various Russian law journals and online legal information 
databases and networks. He obtained no access to statistical data in relation to his research on (the 
fight against) exploitation of prostitution in the Khabarovsk Region: the police and the Ministry 
argued that there were no data available on the number of criminal cases and the number of people 
found liable. According to the domestic authorities, the information Bubon was seeking did not exist 
in the form the applicant was looking for or was kept by another authority. The ECtHR essentially 
notes that the applicant “did not seek access to the statistical data cards or even final statistical 
reports, which were ready and available. Instead he essentially asked the domestic authorities to 
process and summarise information using specific parameters”. And it reiterates that Article 10 ECHR 
“does not impose an obligation to collect information upon the applicant’s request, particularly when, 
as in the present case, a considerable amount of work is involved”.61 
Also in Friedrich Weber v. Germany the ECtHR held that the right to receive information cannot be 
construed as imposing on a State positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its 
own accord, particularly when, as in the present case, a considerable amount of work is involved.
62
 In 
this case an online journalist was refused access to public documents from the municipal budget of 
the city of Wuppertal, requesting a compilation of a list of payments from the city budget to political 
parties, parliamentary groups and political foundations, as well as a list of payments to political 
parties from holding companies that belong to the city. The ECtHR, sitting as a committee with three 
judges, decided that regardless of his possible status as member of the press, there had been no 
interference with the applicant’s right to receive and to impart  information as enshrined in Article 10 
§ 1 ECHR. The ECtHR focused mainly on the fact that the documents were not directly available in the 
form the applicant had requested. The ECtHR noted that the applicant “could have requested 
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budgets, financial statements and balance sheets of the companies as such. Such information would 
have put the applicant in a position to carry out his research on the above mentioned topic or he 
could then have asked for further concrete information”. 
It is obvious that a rigid interpretation of the condition that the requested documents must be ready 
and available in the form the applicant requested, combined with a wide margin of appreciation for 
the member states’ authorities in this matter, risks limiting extensively the newly acquired right of 
access to public documents as recognised in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary. 
2.3. Only protection of ‘lawful’ sources? 
In line with the criticism that was formulated regarding some of the Court’s case law justifying 
interferences against illegal use or reproduction of secret or confidential information (see Bédat v. 
Switzerland (GC), Giesbert and others v. France and Stoll v. Switzerland (GC), supra), we also highlight 
that the judgment in the case in Görmüş and others v. Turkey (cf. supra) contains a worrying 
consideration in this regard.
63
 The ECtHR acknowledged that the duties and responsibilities of 
journalists can include the duty not to publish information provided by whistle-blower State officials 
until such time as the latter had made use of the administrative procedures provided in order to 
draw their superiors’ attention to potentially unlawful acts committed in their workplace. However, 
the Court noted that the Turkish legislation did not provide for such a procedure and therefore the 
journalists could not be criticised for having published the contested information without 
waiting for their sources to raise their concerns through the chain of command. In its original French 
version the Court considered that it could accept “que les devoirs et les responsabilités qu’assument 
les journalistes qui exercent leur droit à la liberté d’expression puissent inclure le devoir de ne pas 
publier les renseignements que des fonctionnaires lanceurs d’alerte leur ont fournis, jusqu’à ce que 
ces fonctionnaires aient utilisé les procédures administratives internes prévues pour faire part de leurs 
préoccupations à leurs supérieurs ”.64 This consideration however, formulated as a general principle 
that journalists should only publish information obtained from whistle-blowers under the condition 
that they shall have first exhausted all internal procedures that are available to them, is certainly 
(too) far-fetched. The consideration also contrasts with earlier case law of the ECtHR in which the 
Court was of the opinion that a “journalist’s right not to reveal her or his sources could not be 
considered a mere privilege to be granted or taken away depending on the lawfulness or 
unlawfulness of their sources, but is part and parcel of the right to information, to be treated with 
the utmost caution”.65 
The outcome in another case related to the protection of journalistic sources, demands for a critical 
observation of another kind. In the case of the Telegraaf Media (..) Van der Graaf  v. the 
Netherlands
66
 the Government finally admitted at the end of long proceedings, that the applicants’ 
right to have their sources protected had been violated by the authorities in the Netherlands. While 
the application before the Court was lodged on 6 May 2011, the Government wrote on 8 November 
2013 to the Court : “(t)he Government hereby wishes to express – by way of unilateral declaration – 
its acknowledgement that the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention were violated in respect of 
the applicants. Consequently, the Government is prepared to reimburse the applicants with any costs 
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and expenses related to the proceedings before the Court, provided they were incurred necessarily 
and are reasonable as to quantum, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. I look 
forward to the Court’s decision in this respect.” 
On the basis of this unilateral declaration, and despite the applicants asking the Court to dismiss the 
Government’s unilateral declaration, the ECtHR finally decided to strike the case out of the list. The 
Court said it was satisfied that the unilateral declaration by the Government offered a sufficient 
basis for finding that respect for Article 10 and the protection of journalistic sources did not require it 
to continue its examination of the application. By the decision the Court missed the opportunity to 
clarify the characteristics of the violation of the applicants’ source protection and to put additional 
pressure on the Netherlands’ Government in order to take steps to effectively guarantee protection 
of journalistic sources, after  already being found three times in violation of Article 10 ECtHR in this 
matter.
67
 Also the applicants had argued, “that despite the Court’s findings of violations of Article 10 
in no fewer than three judgments against the Netherlands, no legislation capable of preventing the 
recurrence of the violation acknowledged was yet in place, and (..) that the guarantees of 
independent review provided by the Lawyers and Journalists (..) Temporary Review Order were 
insufficient”. 
Another peculiar aspect of the Court’s decision in this case is the dismissal of the applicants’ claim for 
costs and expenses in respect of the long and complex domestic proceedings and in respect of the 
proceedings in Strasbourg. The ECtHR drastically reduced the amount of the requested 
compensation, by excluding important parts of the  costs in domestic (injunction) proceedings and 
especially by considering that “the hourly rate charged by the lawyers who assisted the applicants in 
the domestic proceedings, namely EUR 375 per hour, goes well beyond what the Court is prepared to 
consider reasonable”. One can wonder if the actual rate for law firms in large European cities such as 
Amsterdam, London, Brussels, Paris, Rome or Berlin, especially for cases involving complicated legal 
issues related to national security, intelligence and anti-terror policy inducing a diversity of legal 
proceedings against the government or other public agencies, would differ very much from the 
Amsterdam lawyers’ rates in this case.  Therefore it is somewhat surprising that the Court considered 
the applicants’ claims based on the hourly rates charged by the lawyers as going well beyond reason. 
Couldn’t one expect that a victory of principle for victims of human rights violations should also lead 
to adequate compensation in terms of costs and expenses? 
 
A more general observation in this regard is that the Court could more often apply direct measures 
against member states blatantly violating Article 10 rights of journalists and other public 
watchdogs, as the Court did in Fattulayev v. Azerbaijan (ordering the immediate release from prison 
of a journalist convicted of defamation of the government)68 and in Youth Initiative for Human Rights 
v. Serbia (order to provide the applicant NGO with the information requested).69 One may also 
wonder whether victims of violations of their right to freedom of expression will not lose their trust 
or abandon their hope in relying on the ECtHR as the ultimate guarantor of the fundamental rights, 
being confronted with very long delays in the handling of their case before the Strasbourg Court. 
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The recent judgment in the case of Milisavljević v. Serbia is a striking example in this regard.70 The 
case concerns the conviction of a journalist for insult of a well-known human rights activist, a case in 
which the ECtHR, completely in line with its settled case law, emphasises that criminal prosecution 
for insult of public figures is likely to deter journalists from contributing to the public discussion of 
issues affecting the life of the community.  It took the Court more than 10 years to deliver a 
unanimous judgment to conclude that the Serbian authorities’ reaction to the journalist’s article was 
disproportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of others, and was therefore not 
necessary in a democratic society, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 ECHR. 
 
2.4. Protection of whistle-blowers not always sufficiently guaranteed 
Despite the crucial and substantial protection of whistle-blowers reflected in the Court’s case law 
since Guja v. Moldova, the Court in some cases took a more deferential position, accepting far- 
reaching cases of interference with the rights of whistle-blowers or severe sanctions because of 
leaking public interest information.  
In Pasko v. Russia71 for instance the applicant was a military journalist and researcher who disclosed 
information to the Japanese media about massive dumping of nuclear waste by the Russian navy. 
After being found in possession of classified information he was convicted for treason through 
espionage for having collected secret information with the intention of transferring it to a foreign 
national. The Court observed that the applicant was convicted “as a serving military officer, and not 
as a journalist, of treason through espionage for having collected and kept, with the intention of 
transferring it to a foreign national, information of a military nature that was classified as a State 
secret” and it considered ”that the domestic courts cannot be said to have overstepped the limits of 
the margin of appreciation which is to be left to the domestic authorities in matters of national 
security”. In Pasko v. Russia the ECtHR however failed to apply the Guja-criteria, while the 
information at issue concerned serious environmental issues, relating to massive nuclear pollution. 
The Court choose rather to emphasise that “the applicant was bound by an obligation of discretion in 
relation to anything concerning the performance of his duties” and that “the information concerning 
military exercises which the applicant had collected and kept was capable of causing considerable 
damage to national security”. Most striking is the finding by the Court that the conviction of Pasko to 
four years imprisonment “was very lenient” (sic). The ECtHR explained its finding by referring to the 
fact that this sanction was “much lower” than the sanctions provided by law of twelve to twenty 
years' imprisonment and confiscation of property. Therefore Court is of the opinion that there was 
no “lack of a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the 
legitimate aim pursued”, and that “(t)here is nothing in the materials of the case to support the 
applicant's allegation that his conviction was overly broad or politically motivated or that he had 
been sanctioned for any of his publications”. 
The case of Langner v. Germany72 concerns the accusation, uttered by a civil servant during a staff 
meeting in a municipal Housing Committee in the presence of some external participants, of 
“perversion of justice” by a deputy mayor. At the request of his superior Langner substantiated his 
intervention in writing, referring to some concrete allegations of misconduct in housing policy in 
                                                           
70
 ECtHR 4 April 2017, Milisavljević v. Serbia. 
71
 ECtHR 22 October 2009, Pasko v. Russia. 
72
 ECtHR (Decision) 17 September 2015, Case No. 14464/1, Langner v. Germany. 
relation to a demolition permit in which the deputy mayor (W.) was involved. A short time later 
Langner was dismissed. According to the letter of dismissal, Langner’s accusations against W. had 
been unjustified. By making these accusations in front of a large number of staff members and 
representatives of the staff committee and of the trade union, Langner had damaged his superior’s 
reputation and thus irrevocably destroyed the mutual trust which was necessary for effective co-
operation. A few months later a local newspaper published a letter to the editor in which Langner 
expressed the opinion that the deputy mayor lacked any competence for resolving problems relating 
to housing issues. At two instances labour courts found that the employment contract had not been 
terminated by the dismissal since this could not be justified under section 1 of the Unfair Dismissal 
Act. The labour court did not find it necessary to decide whether Langner’s allegations had been 
correct, as they were, in any event, covered by his right to freedom of expression. At a later stage in 
the domestic proceedings, however, the Labour Court of Appeal found that Langner’s dismissal had 
been justified because Langner, in his statement at the staff meeting and in his subsequent written 
submissions, had seriously insulted and slandered the deputy mayor by accusing him of perversion of 
justice. Furthermore the allegations had turned out to be unfounded. The ECtHR confirmed the 
justification of the interference with Langner’s right to freedom of expression, considering inter alia 
that “the unfounded allegation of a serious crime” were “rather a defamatory accusation than a 
criticism in the interest of the public”. Referring to the domestic authorities’ findings, the ECtHR also 
held that Langner’s statement “was not aimed at uncovering an unacceptable situation within the 
Housing Office, but was rather motivated by the applicant’s personal misgivings about the Deputy 
Mayor arising from the prospect of the impending dissolution of his sub-division”. Therefore the 
ECtHR is of the opinion that the current case has “to be distinguished from cases of “whistle-
blowing”, an action warranting special protection under Article 10 of the Convention, in which an 
employee reports a criminal offence in order to draw attention to alleged unlawful conduct of the 
employer”. One may wonder whether this kind of reasoning does not hold the risk that in the future 
the protection of whistle-blowers on the basis of Article 10 ECHR and the right to freedom of 
expression in the employment relation might be substantially weakened in practice. 
Most worrying from the perspective of freedom of expression of civil servants is the recent judgment 
in the case of Karapetyan and others v. Armenia, a judgment that became final on 24 April 2017, 
after the refusal by the Court’s panel to refer the case, on request of the applicants, to the Grand 
Chamber.
73
 In Karapetyan and others v. Armenia the ECtHR considered Article 10 ECtHR applicable 
with regard to the reaction and sanction by the public authorities because of the expression of a 
political view in a public statement by civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In that 
statement the applicants had expressed their concern with the situation created in Armenia and the 
alleged fraud of the election process (in 2008), which, according to the statement “shadow the will of 
our country and society to conduct a civilised, fair and free presidential election”. The statement 
continued : “As citizens of Armenia, we demand that urgent steps be undertaken to call into life the 
recommendations contained in the reports of the international observation mission, as well as other 
prominent international organisations. Only by acting in conformity with the letter and spirit of the 
law can we create democracy and tolerance in Armenia and earn the country a good reputation 
abroad”. The ECtHR found that the applicants’ dismissal from their posts as a result of this statement 
“clearly constituted” an interference with their right to freedom of expression74. The Court however 
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found that the dismissal of the applicants did not amount to a violation of their rights guaranteed 
under Article 10 ECHR. 
The judgment is highly controversial, as it seems to go against some of the principles and approach in 
the Grand Chamber’s judgment in the case of Baka v. Hungary75 and other case law of the Court on 
the right to freedom of expression in the employment relation.
76
 In a dissenting opinion, judge 
Trajkovska emphasises that it does not emerge from the reasoning of the domestic courts what 
“pressing social need” existed to justify, as proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, the 
protection of the Armenian State’s interests over the applicants’ right to freedom of expression. 
Moreover she notes that the Court has usually considered dismissal from employment to be a very 
harsh measure, particularly when other more lenient and more appropriate disciplinary sanctions 
could or should have been envisaged, while it appears that the domestic authorities did not consider 
the imposition of other sanctions, but instead proceeded instantly, as a result of applicants’ actions, 
to their dismissal from office. Furthermore, the effects of the applicants’ dismissal were severe, as 
they were deprived of the opportunity to exercise the profession for which they had a calling, for 
which they had been trained and in which they had acquired skills and experience. Even taking into 
account the difficult political situation at the time and allowing the national authorities a certain 
margin of appreciation, to dismiss the applicants from their posts as diplomats was disproportionate 
to the legitimate aim pursued, according to the dissenting opinion. 
Others77 have criticised the judgment as the Court’s emphasis on “a politically neutral body of civil 
servants” is troublesome, “because it appears to reduce civil servants to mere lackeys of the 
executive, rather than potential defenders of democracy. Yet, there are good reasons to consider the 
alternative viewpoint”. The majority finding in Karapetyan a.o. v. Armenia is indeed “worrying”, 
because it bars senior civil servants from speaking out in defence of democracy and the rule of law. 
The Court’s decision also neglects to a large extent the content of the petition at issue, as the 
applicant’s statements were manifestly of a peaceful nature. The petition indeed called for “the 
preservation of stability in the country” and for “our compatriots and especially the representatives of 
all the structures in the country responsible for maintaining public order and peace to avoid the 




This article showed how the ECtHR has delivered significant support to securing the right to freedom 
of expression and information with regard protection of acts of newsgathering and investigative 
journalism, access to official documents, protection of journalistic sources, and protection of whistle-
blowers based on the right to freedom of expression through its jurisprudence of the last decade. 
The second part of the analysis, however, exposed some weaknesses or inconsistencies in the Court’s 
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case law applying Article 10 ECHR in each of these matters. It also focused on some considerations by 
the Court that risk neglecting crucial aspects of journalists’ and civil society’s rights to freedom of 
expression and information. 
It will undoubtedly be the Court’s main challenge to remain extremely aware of its task as the 
ultimate guarantor to protect the right to freedom of expression in Europe. Therefore it will need to 
keep on strictly scrutinising all kind of interference with journalists’, media outlets’, NGOs’ and other 
public watchdogs’ rights, and hence to leave a narrow margin of appreciation to the member states 
in these matters. That is the actual and future task the Court is facing so as not to risk a diminution of 
the high standards of protection it has developed. In the actual political context in Europe it is the 
Court’s task, more than ever, to reinforce freedom of expression and information as a key element in 
democracy : “Au moment où les vents sont contraires, nous pensons que notre Cour doit plus que 
jamais renforcer la liberté d’expression qui, loin de constituer une protection ou un privilège, est un 
des éléments clés de la démocratie”.78 
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